Two verifiers. Real receipts. Copies that must fail.
Every exhibit here is a signed ICA receipt from production, saved 2026-11-07. Two verifiers, one in Node and one in Python on a different crypto library, check each one offline against ICA's pinned keys, and they must agree. Tampered copies sit beside the real ones, and both verifiers must refuse them. Nothing here asks you to trust an ALEETH server: every check runs on your device, and the kit runs with your network off.
An allowed action, a refused action, a halt
Each is the evidence package ICA's public endpoint served for that receipt, saved byte for byte. The verdicts below are what both verifiers returned on build day with the pinned trust anchor and --require-pin. The last column is this page re-checking the receipt hash, the Ed25519 signature against the pinned key and the Merkle path, on your device.
| Exhibit | What it is | Node verifier | Python verifier | On this device |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01-allowed | An allowed action, decided by the Tool Gateway | HISTORICALLY_VALID_REVOKED_NOW | HISTORICALLY_VALID_REVOKED_NOW | re-checked here when scripts run; run VERIFY.sh for every leg |
| 02-refused | A refused action, from the 2026-10-03 Proof Room | HISTORICALLY_VALID_REVOKED_NOW | HISTORICALLY_VALID_REVOKED_NOW | re-checked here when scripts run; run VERIFY.sh for every leg |
| 03-halt | A halt: ICA stopping ALEETH's own agent | HISTORICALLY_VALID_REVOKED_NOW | HISTORICALLY_VALID_REVOKED_NOW | re-checked here when scripts run; run VERIFY.sh for every leg |
An allowed action, decided by the Tool Gateway
A tool_gateway_decision receipt with decision allow: a squadron agent (TIER_1) read the CRM inside its approved scope, rule allow_within_scope, rollback none required for a read. It came from the post-deploy proof run of 2026-10-21 (mission prove-build-order-1792554071729) and is labelled a proof run, so it is never counted as customer activity. Signed with the primary Ed25519 key only: tool gateway receipts carry no ES256 or ML-DSA leg today. Signed by ica-receipt-vault-1, authorized at the event and retired at the 2026-10-22 key switch, so the verdict is HISTORICALLY_VALID_REVOKED_NOW with external finality PASS.
A refused action, from the 2026-10-03 Proof Room
A tool_gateway_decision receipt with decision deny: an NVIDIA Nemotron Nano 12B agent inside NVIDIA OpenShell tried to POST to a webhook, and ICA refused it because no signed scope contract was on record (fail closed). The intent string names the demo scenario (a county emergency operations duty officer reading public weather alerts); it is a scenario label, not a customer. One of the 141 such refusals in the 2026-10-03 Proof Room. Its root was stamped by freetsa.org on 2026-10-02, and the package carries that RFC 3161 token. Signed by ica-receipt-vault-1, authorized at the event and retired at the 2026-10-22 key switch, so the verdict is HISTORICALLY_VALID_REVOKED_NOW with external finality PASS.
A halt: ICA stopping ALEETH's own agent
A rail_guard_halt receipt with all three signature legs (Ed25519, AWS KMS ES256 FIPS, ML-DSA-65), signer authority, Merkle inclusion and an RFC 3161 timestamp over the root. Its signed reason records ALEETH's own agent, aleeth-brain-01, attempting a cross-tenant rescore; ICA's kill switch halted it. ICA holds ALEETH's own agents to the same boundary as anyone else's. Its Ed25519 leg is ica-receipt-vault-1, authorized at the event and retired at the 2026-10-22 key switch, so the verdict is HISTORICALLY_VALID_REVOKED_NOW with external finality PASS.
Bitcoin, stated separately
Neither verifier checks Bitcoin, and no verdict above includes it. Each package's custody.external_anchor carries the OpenTimestamps proof of the ICA audit seal that covers its root; check it with an OpenTimestamps client (ots verify). The link from a receipt's root to that seal rests on ICA's audit chain, which these packages do not carry.
Tampered copies that must fail
Each starts from a real exhibit above and changes one thing. Must fail means never a pass verdict. Each row states the exact verdict the verifiers give, because the reason it fails is the point.
| Copy | What changed | Node verifier | Python verifier | On this device |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| tampered_body | The refused decision rewritten to allow, with nothing else changed. The body no longer hashes to its receipt hash. | INVALID | INVALID | re-checked here when scripts run |
| forged_stranger_key | The refusal rewritten to allow and re-signed by a key ICA never held, bundled under ICA's key id. The math checks, so only the pinned trust anchor catches it. | INVALID KEY_NOT_PINNED | INVALID KEY_NOT_PINNED | re-checked here when scripts run |
| tampered_inclusion | One sibling hash of the Merkle inclusion proof changed. The proof no longer rebuilds the anchored root. | INVALID | INVALID | re-checked here when scripts run |
| anchor_tampered | One character of the RFC 3161 token's signature changed. The receipt itself is genuine, so it is not INVALID; its time anchor no longer proves, so it never passes. | INDETERMINATE | INDETERMINATE | checked by the two verifiers in VERIFY.sh |
| revoked_before_event | The bundle states the signing key was revoked an hour before the event. The signature checks, but the signer had no authority at that time. | INVALID_AT_EVENT_TIME | INVALID_AT_EVENT_TIME | checked by the two verifiers in VERIFY.sh |
INVALID: the evidence is forged or broken. INVALID_AT_EVENT_TIME: the signature checks, but the signer had no authority at that moment. INDETERMINATE: the receipt is genuine, but its time anchor no longer proves anything, so it never passes. This page's own checker reads hashes, Ed25519 and Merkle paths; the RFC 3161 token and key authority are checked by the two verifiers, in VERIFY.sh.
The anchor spine
ICA anchors its receipt ledger in signed Merkle windows, each naming the one before it. Read on build day, GET /api/transparency/anchors listed 1478 windows with its strict check reading verified false: the chain breaks at 419, 438, 459. Those three windows are genesis-shaped re-anchors from 2026-08-30 to 2026-09-01, written while a failed read of the previous anchor was swallowed. The cause is fixed, and the three are registered with it in ICA's exceptions register, copied here.
| Window | Anchor receipt | Anchored | Leaves |
|---|---|---|---|
| 419 | 973bd58852f6dd015c4d6ca89eaddf60f0e36ad2290405ea60aae6a273dbb7fc | 2026-08-30T10:49:15.323Z | 178,860 |
| 438 | 76d8c9cd2dabd0359690890e348f209dc6533162e02711c577d3b5d92e2a1b00 | 2026-08-31T03:04:17.042Z | 183,947 |
| 459 | 05040b9baf0a0349a97f9f76fd83d164dd9f986257f0dd099939c412e9e83fd4 | 2026-09-01T04:14:21.785Z | 191,775 |
This kit carries ICA's registered-exception material (exhibits/04-anchor/anchor-exceptions.json). VERIFY.sh checks it with the Node verifier and must read VERIFIED_WITH_REGISTERED_EXCEPTIONS; the method is sampled and says so. The strict verdict stays strict.
Decision latency, recomputed from sealed rollups
ICA publishes how long its decision functions take, from rollups it seals every fifteen minutes. This kit holds every rollup the 24-hour read counted. Each one's hash and signature are checked, their bucket counts are added, and every percentile is recomputed. Both drivers reproduce the published figures exactly.
| Decision function | Decisions timed | p50 | p95 | p99 | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Route policy enforcement point | 18,305 | 131.1 µs | 294.9 µs | 655.4 µs | reproduced |
| Tool gateway decision kernel | 12,925 | 57.3 µs | 131.1 µs | 360.4 µs | reproduced |
| budget (gateway stage) | 12,925 | 15.4 µs | 28.7 µs | 98.3 µs | reproduced |
| identity (gateway stage) | 12,925 | 5.6 µs | 9.2 µs | 18.4 µs | reproduced |
| tenant (gateway stage) | 12,925 | 0.9 µs | 1.5 µs | 2.8 µs | reproduced |
| scope contract (gateway stage) | 12,925 | 0.7 µs | 1.2 µs | 1.5 µs | reproduced |
| tool (gateway stage) | 12,925 | 30.7 µs | 81.9 µs | 180.2 µs | reproduced |
| approval (gateway stage) | 12,895 | 1.0 µs | 2.3 µs | 6.1 µs | reproduced |
| tightening layers (gateway stage) | 12,925 | 27.26 ms | 83.89 ms | 184.55 ms | reproduced |
Route policy enforcement point: In-process decision time only, excluding data reads, evidence writes, sealing and network. The endpoint's own definition: Decision latency is the in-process time a decision function takes to compute its allow, deny or require-approval answer, measured with process.hrtime.bigint() from just before the function reads its inputs to just after it returns its decision. A p99 is withheld below 100 samples, never rounded into a number.
Build day: 93 sealed rollups checked (receipt hash and Ed25519 signature against the pinned key), every figure above recomputed exactly by both drivers. Read 2026-11-07T08:04:50.293Z.
Confirm the keys on your phone
A verdict proves who signed only when the key is pinned. Open https://ica.aleeth.com/.well-known/ica-trust-anchor.json on your phone, over a different network, and check that each fingerprint below matches. The same list is in trust/FINGERPRINTS.txt.
b4dc 36ef 57cb adf6 9084 9adc 3923 afdd 660f af39 2a97 6b4a 73b3 b8db 7941 c058
fa63 cbce dc5f c9e9 33b9 41a2 44e8 3a2a 7f8e ad2a f401 cbb0 43cf b853 436b b4d7
bf3f 77c2 74d6 6d3d e6d9 2168 fdc3 d629 cef9 7fd5 110e 5743 c55b 19cc ae1d a1d5
7635 06ed c0c6 24db f164 99e8 98c6 450e 5594 652a 26c6 6d9b 1eae 4c87 96e7 9c72
23d5 2e3f f727 52d9 4dbc dd14 ce47 846f 7664 4cef 9f4b 9a88 8da2 5ed7 a95e 1c33
f957 0d00 db4a 2436 abee ef8f a8ca aa95 a1df be1c f587 7d07 0f51 f0bd bb1e 069b
c9c9 6d6c 1c08 4622 401a c276 ff6d ae89 e706 a15c ef8a 4fd9 c47e c503 35b5 2c9e
Offline, on your machine
Download the kit, unzip it, turn the network off, then run either driver from its folder. Each runs both verifiers over every exhibit, compares their verdicts and exits non-zero on any mismatch.
Every file is also served on its own under aleeth.com/proof/kit/, listed with its sha256 in MANIFEST.json. Start with README.md.
bash VERIFY.sh python3 run_checks.py
You need Node 24 or later and python3 with the cryptography package built with ML-DSA. If either is missing, both drivers print INDETERMINATE with the reason and claim nothing: a post-quantum signature nobody checked is never counted as a pass. Every file's sha256 is in MANIFEST.json, with the production commit read on build day.
Exit 0: everything holds. 1: a verifier disagreed, a verdict was wrong, a tampered copy passed or a file changed. 3: INDETERMINATE. 4: everything present holds and an exhibit is still pending.
Words on this page
- tsm
- tsm is ALEETH's own reference tenant id. Every exhibit is on it.
- VERIFIED_EXTERNALLY_ANCHORED
- Every signature present verifies against a pinned key, the signer was authorized at the event, the receipt is a leaf of a signed Merkle root, and an RFC 3161 timestamp authority stamped that root.
- VERIFIED_INTERNAL_FINALITY
- The same, with the Merkle root signed by ICA but no RFC 3161 token in the package.
- HISTORICALLY_VALID_REVOKED_NOW
- Every check holds and the signer was authorized when it signed, but its key has been retired since. ICA retired its primary key ica-receipt-vault-1 at its 2026-10-22 key switch, so every receipt that key signed before then reads this way, however it was anchored. Whether its root was stamped shows in the RFC 3161 time row, which both drivers also require.
- Pinned
- The key in the package is the key the saved trust anchor holds under the same id. Without a pin, anyone could bundle their own key under ICA's id; --require-pin refuses that.
- Three signature legs
- Ed25519 (the primary), ES256 from an AWS KMS key in a FIPS-validated module, and ML-DSA-65, a post-quantum signature, all over the same bytes.
Built 2026-11-07 from ICA production commit 2fc43bbf736a85f0cd2f1a9e2830b1413ac27738. The verifiers in this kit are the files at that commit; the Node verifier is byte for byte the one ICA serves at /tools/ica-verify/verify.js.
See it inside your own operation.
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