{
  "name": "ICA Agentic Threat Surface (ATT&CK x ICA Control Mapping)",
  "versions": {
    "attack": "16",
    "navigator": "5.0.1",
    "layer": "4.5"
  },
  "domain": "enterprise-attack",
  "description": "Published by ALEETH. The MITRE ATT&CK techniques an autonomous AI agent is most likely to reach through its tools, mapped to the Institutional Control Architecture that governs the tool call. This is ICA's control mapping, not a third-party certification. Each technique is colored by the ICA control that primarily answers it, and annotated with the OWASP MCP Top 10 risk it corresponds to and the MITRE D3FEND countermeasure family. Gate decides before the act. Contain stops and isolates mid-path. Seal writes a signed, append-only record no actor inside the system can rewrite. Technique IDs are stable across recent ATT&CK releases. Update the attack version field if you import on a newer release. Home: aleeth.com/crosswalk",
  "filters": {
    "platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "Cloud", "Containers", "Network", "SaaS", "IaaS", "Identity Provider"]
  },
  "sorting": 0,
  "layout": {
    "layout": "side",
    "aggregateFunction": "average",
    "showID": false,
    "showName": true,
    "showAggregateScores": false,
    "countUnscored": false,
    "expandedSubtechniques": "none"
  },
  "hideDisabled": true,
  "techniques": [
    { "techniqueID": "T1078", "color": "#D2B373", "enabled": true, "comment": "OWASP MCP01 token mismanagement, MCP07 insufficient auth. D3FEND Credential Hardening. ICA Gate: the token is scoped to one tenant by signed claim and is revocable before the call runs." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1552", "color": "#D2B373", "enabled": true, "showSubtechniques": true, "comment": "OWASP MCP01 secrets in config, env, memory, or logs. D3FEND Credential Hardening. ICA Gate: a governed call reaching a secret store is denied, and receipts never store plaintext." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1552.001", "color": "#D2B373", "enabled": true, "comment": "Credentials in files and environment variables. ICA Gate: denied at the boundary; sealed." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1555", "color": "#D2B373", "enabled": true, "comment": "OWASP MCP10 context and memory leakage. D3FEND Credential Hardening. ICA Gate: store access is authorized per call and sealed." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1068", "color": "#D2B373", "enabled": true, "comment": "OWASP MCP02 privilege escalation via tool scope creep. D3FEND Platform Hardening. ICA Gate: least authority enforced per call, elevation denied." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1548", "color": "#D2B373", "enabled": true, "comment": "Abuse elevation control when a tool runs with excess privilege. D3FEND Platform Hardening. ICA Gate: elevation denied at the decision point." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1195", "color": "#D2B373", "enabled": true, "showSubtechniques": true, "comment": "OWASP MCP04 supply-chain compromise of an MCP package or connector. D3FEND Supply Chain Integrity. ICA Gate: only governed, attested servers are admitted." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1195.001", "color": "#D2B373", "enabled": true, "comment": "Compromise software dependencies. ICA Gate: attestation required before admission." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1036", "color": "#D2B373", "enabled": true, "comment": "Masquerading as a shadow MCP server or a poisoned tool name. D3FEND Detect and Harden. ICA Gate: only registered, identity-bound servers are admitted." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1059", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "showSubtechniques": true, "comment": "OWASP MCP05 command and code injection via tool parameters. D3FEND Execution Isolation. ICA Contain: the crossing act is halted by STOP before it executes." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1059.004", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "comment": "Unix shell, common in MCP servers. ICA Contain: gated, then halted on the crossing act." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1059.006", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "comment": "Python, a frequent MCP runtime. ICA Contain: gated, then halted on the crossing act." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1203", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "comment": "Exploitation for client execution when a tool processes untrusted input. D3FEND Execution Isolation. ICA Contain: STOP halts the agent." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1003", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "showSubtechniques": true, "comment": "OS credential dumping via an over-privileged tool. D3FEND Process Analysis. ICA Contain: gated, then halted and the agent quarantined." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1003.006", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "comment": "DCSync. A governed tool call attempting directory replication is a high-severity halt. D3FEND Credential Hardening and Detect. ICA Contain: denied and quarantined." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1558", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "showSubtechniques": true, "comment": "Steal or forge Kerberos tickets through agent tooling. D3FEND Credential Hardening. ICA Contain: the tool call is gated and halted." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1098", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "comment": "Account manipulation for persistence via an MCP-managed identity. D3FEND Credential Hardening. ICA Contain: gated, then quarantined." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1021", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "comment": "Remote services used for lateral movement by a tool that can reach other systems. D3FEND Network Isolation. ICA Contain: gated, then quarantined." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1567", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "comment": "Exfiltration over a web service, MCP used as the channel. D3FEND Network Isolation. ICA Contain: STOP halts the crossing act." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1048", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "comment": "Exfiltration over an alternative protocol, MCP used as a C2 or exfil channel. D3FEND Network Isolation. ICA Contain: STOP halts the crossing act." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1496", "color": "#B8925A", "enabled": true, "comment": "Resource hijacking and cost harvesting through unbounded tool use. D3FEND Isolate. ICA Contain: the budget circuit breaker safe-halts the agent." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1562", "color": "#E4CE9E", "enabled": true, "comment": "OWASP MCP08 impair defenses by disabling logging. D3FEND Detect. ICA Seal: the audit trail is append-only and anchored to an independent public ledger, so it cannot be turned off from inside." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1070", "color": "#E4CE9E", "enabled": true, "comment": "Indicator removal by clearing logs. D3FEND Detect and Restore. ICA Seal: signed receipts cannot be rewritten by the application that produced them." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1027", "color": "#E4CE9E", "enabled": true, "comment": "OWASP MCP03 tool poisoning through hidden instructions in a tool schema. D3FEND Detect. ICA Seal: every tool description and every call is sealed for review." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1213", "color": "#E4CE9E", "enabled": true, "comment": "Data from information repositories, a common MCP use case. D3FEND Detect. ICA Seal: the call is authorized at the gate and the read is sealed in a receipt." },
    { "techniqueID": "T1530", "color": "#E4CE9E", "enabled": true, "comment": "Data from cloud storage through MCP resource access. D3FEND Detect. ICA Seal: authorized at the gate, sealed on read." }
  ],
  "gradient": {
    "colors": ["#E4CE9E", "#D2B373"],
    "minValue": 0,
    "maxValue": 100
  },
  "legendItems": [
    { "label": "Gate: decide before the act, deny or scope or require authority", "color": "#D2B373" },
    { "label": "Contain: STOP, quarantine, kill switch, budget safe-halt", "color": "#B8925A" },
    { "label": "Seal: signed receipt and append-only anchored audit", "color": "#E4CE9E" }
  ],
  "metadata": [
    { "name": "Published by", "value": "ALEETH, The Schreck Group, Inc." },
    { "name": "Home", "value": "aleeth.com/crosswalk" },
    { "name": "Scope", "value": "ICA control mapping for agentic and MCP threat surface. Not a third-party certification." },
    { "name": "Frameworks referenced", "value": "MITRE ATT&CK, MITRE D3FEND, OWASP MCP Top 10" }
  ],
  "links": [
    { "label": "Published by ALEETH", "url": "https://aleeth.com/crosswalk" }
  ],
  "showTacticRowBackground": true,
  "tacticRowBackground": "#231F20",
  "selectTechniquesAcrossTactics": true,
  "selectSubtechniquesWithParent": false,
  "selectVisibleTechniques": false
}